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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEYS-STATUTORY CONTINUANCE OF TRIALS WHERE ATORNEY IS
ATTENDING LEGisLATURF--[Missouri] .- In State ex. rel. Union Electrio Light
and Power Co. v. Sevier, Circuit Judge,1 the Supreme Court of Missouri con-
sidered the right of a trial judge to dismiss a case because of the failure
of the plaintiff's lawyers to appear, when the court knew that the plaintiff's
chief counsel was a member of, and was attending, the 58th General Assem-
bly of the State of Missouri, then in session. Held: affirming the decision
of the trial court, that Section 938 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,22
which provides for a continuance where counsel is a member of the Missouri
Legislature, does not provide for an automatic continuance, but requires
affidavit and application.
Section 938 has been before the public recently in connection with the
St. Louis election fraud cases, in which the defendants retained a member
of the General Assembly as counsel and thus secured a continuance. As
the statute now stands, the allowance of the continuance is mandatory upon
the trial judge, the statute having been so construed in State v. Clark.3
Some statutory provision of this nature is salutary in view of the pre-
ponderance of lawyers in the Missouri Legislature. Many of these lawyer-
members cannot live on their salaries as legislators without keeping up
private legal practice. At the same time, if the legislature is to function
efficiently they cannot be spared from the Capitol to attend trials. The
present statute becomes undesirable only when the privilege is abused, as
in cases in which the retention of a member of the General Assembly as
counsel is resorted to solely for the purpose of obtaining delay.
At the current session of the General Assembly, a bill4 was introduced
1. 98 S. W. (2d) 980 (Mo., 1936).
2. "In all suits at law or in equity or in criminal cases pending in any
court of this state at any time when the general assembly is in session, it
shall be a sufficient cause for a continuance if it shall appear to the court,
by affidavit, that any party applying for such continuance or any attorney
* . . of such party is a member of either house of the general assembly,
and in actual attendance on the session of the same, and the attendance
of such party is necessary to a fair and proper trial or other proceeding
in such suit; and on the filing of such affidavit the court shall continue
such suit . . . etc."
3. 214 Mo. App. 536, 262 S. W. 413 (1924).
4. House Bill No. 75, 59th General Assembly. The bill would retain the
greater part of the present statute, but would add the provision "that
where the member of the general assembly shall be attorney or counsel for
the defendant, and where the plaintiff, or the State in criminal matters,
shall file an affidavit alleging that the member of the general assembly was
employed as attorney or counsel after the convening of the general assem-
bly, or has not been properly retained, or. that there are other or previous
counsel of record in the pending matter fully in possession of the law and
facts and able to proceed with the defense of the matter, and that the
entry of appearance of the member of the general assembly is for the sole
purpose of hindering and delaying the administration of justice, the court
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for the repeal of Section 938 and for the substitution therefor of a new
provision which would make it discretionary with the trial judge to grant
a continuance. Under such a statute, the court could weigh all the circum-
stances of the particular case before passing upon the motion for a continu-
ance. The value of this discretion, particularly in cases in which there is a
suggestion of bad faith, is evident.
Although it is difficult to see how this bill might adversely affect honest
lawyers, it was killed in the House Judiciary Committee, and a motion by
its sponsor that it be placed on the House Calendar for perfection failed to
pass.5 Apparently the chief objection urged to the bill was that it applied
only to lawyers retained by defendants. This objection hardly explains the
defeat of the entire measure, as the defect pointed out could have been
cured by amendment either in committee or by the House.
B. W. T.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv-CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LAws-DuE PROCESS OF
LAW: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF AsSEMBLY-[United States].-The en-
forcement of the now increasingly important criminal syndicalism laws, an
outgrowth of post-war problems,' was given a setback by a recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court.2 The defendant was indicted for vio-
lation of the Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon.' The indictment did not
charge the defendant with advocating the doctrine of criminal vandalism,
but did charge him with having assisted in the conduct of a meeting held
under the auspices of the Communist Party, which party, it was proven,
advocated the outlawed doctrine. The meeting, which had been called for
the purpose of discussing the treatment accorded the maritime strikers,
was conducted in an orderly manner, and the majority of those attending
it were not members of the Communist Party. The state court affirmed the
conviction. 4 On appeal: Reversed. Chief Justice Hughes, delivering the
opinion of the court, added to his already impressive pronouncements pro-
tecting freedom of speech and of the press,5 by holding that the act as
shall set a hearing on the affidavit, not earlier than 10 days after the filing
of such affidavit by the plaintiff, and upon the presentation of substantial
evidence supporting the said affidavit, the court may direct that the trial
proceed."
5. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 18, 1937.
1. Note, Criminal Syndicalism Statutes Before the Supreme Court (1928)
76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 198.
2. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 57 S. Ct. 255 (Jan. 4, 1937).
3. Oregon Code 1930, secs. 14-3, 110 to 14-3, 112, as amended by chap.
459, p. 868, sees. 1 to 3, Oregon Laws 1933. Section 14-3, 110 reads:
"Criminal syndicalism hereby is defined to be the doctrine which advocates
crime, physical violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts or methods as a
means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolu-
tion."
4. State v. Do Jonge, 152 Ore. 315, 51 P. (2d) 674 (1935).
5. See Chief Justice Hughes' opinions in the following cases: Stromberg
v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484
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